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RECENT CASES
DUE PROCESS-HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS HAVE A
LEGITIMATE CLAIM OF ENTITLEMENT TO EDUCATION AND MAY NOT BE SUSPENDED FOR A SHORT
TERM WITHOUT PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS-Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
In February, 1971, Dwight Lopez, a student at Central
High School in Columbus, Ohio, was suspended by the principal as a result of a cafeteria fracas at his school. At least 75
other students were similarly suspended the same day.' Lopez
later testified that he had been present during the disturbance,
but was merely an innocent bystander.' He was not given a
hearing (the record is silent as to whether he asked for one);
there was no evidence that he was involved in destructive conduct; and-evidently because he misunderstood the terms of
his suspension-he remained away from school for roughly 20
days. Consequently, he was transferred to a continuation
school.3
Similar student demonstrations occurred in other Columbus, Ohio, public schools over about a two-month period, and
a number of students were suspended 4 pursuant to an Ohio
statute which authorized a principal to suspend or expel a student for misconduct.5 The statute required only that the principal notify the parents, stating a reason for his action, within
24 hours. While an expelled student was expressly accorded the
right to a hearing before the local Board of Education, a suspended student was provided no such opportunity.
Dwight Lopez challenged the constitutionality of this policy, joining in a class action suit with eight other students, each
of whom had been suspended for up to 10 days without a hearing.' A three-judge federal court invalidated the Ohio statute,
1. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 570 (1975), aff'g Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp.
1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973); see Comment, Due Process in School Discipline:The Effect of

Goss v. Lopez, 12 SAN DiEao L. REV. 912 (1975).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1282 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub nom.
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). These disturbances were racially based; the disruption at Central High School occurred as a result of tension concerning Black History
Week.
5. OfIfo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.66 (1972).
6. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd sub nom. Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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holding that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment protects a student's right to education against state infringement.7 School administrators appealed; the Supreme
Court accepted jurisdiction of the case as Goss v. Lopez.8
Goss v. Lopez raised an issue which had troubled the lower
courts.' Since the landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education, 0 which involved expulsion of a state university student, due process rights of notice and hearing had
been extended to students facing expulsion or long-term suspensions from school." However, the courts could not agree
whether due process rights applied to short-term suspensions.
A majority of courts ruled that due process did not extend
to short suspensions.' 2 Only a handful of cases, none of which
involved California law, accorded Dixon rights to victims of a
short suspension.' 3 Judicial reluctance to extend Dixon may be
attributable to a belief that courts should not interfere in the
educational process. For example, in Madera v. Board of
Education4 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed:
Law and order in the classroom should be the responsibility of our respective educational systems. The courts
should not usurp this function and turn disciplinary problems, involving suspension, into criminal adversary proceedings-which they definitely are not.'"
In a five to four decision, the Goss Court affirmed the lower
7. Id. at 1302.
8. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
9. Note, ProceduralDue Processand Short Suspensions from the Public Schools:
Prologue to Goss v. Lopez, 50 NoTR DAME LAw. 364 (1974).
10. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). This was the first
major decision which recognized that students facing expulsion from school are entitled to due process.
11. See, e.g., Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (hearing required in expulsion of student from U.S. Merchant Marine Academy); Vought v. Van
Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969) (expulsion of public high
school student); Knight v. State Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. 1961)
(due process applies to expulsion of state university student).
12. See, e.g., Black Coalition v. Portland School Dist. No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040 (9th
Cir. 1973); Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971); Madera v. Bd. of Educ., 386
F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
13. See, e.g., Black Students of North Fort Myers Jr.-Sr. High School ex rel.
Shoemaker v. Williams, 317 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd, 470 F.2d 957 (5th
Cir. 1972) (injunction against summary suspensions for student walkouts). But cf.
Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
14. 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967).
15. Id. at 788-89.
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court decision, holding that a student's right to education is a
constitutionally protected interest'" encompassing both a liberty and a property right." A student facing suspension' 8 is
therefore entitled, as a minimum, to oral or written notice of
the charges, an opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case, an explanation of the evidence, and an

opportunity to present his side of the story.'"
The Court reasoned that if a state mandates education for
children between specified ages, as Ohio does, 0 students have
a "legitimate claim of entitlement"' amounting to a property
interest in public education."
Protected interests in property are normally "not created
by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their
dimensions are defined" by an independent source such as
state statutes or rules entitling the citizen to certain benefits.2

Similarly, recognizing that suspension might label a student as
a trouble-maker, thus injuring his reputation and standing
with peers and teachers, the Court held that students have a
liberty interest in their reputations."
The Court rejected appellant's assertion that a suspension
of ten days or less is not a serious deprivation and thus not
worthy of due process protection. The Court again stressed, as
it had earlier in Board of Regents v. Roth, 5 that
in determining "whether due process requirements apply
in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to
16. 419 U.S. at 565.
17. Id. at 574-75.
18. Id. at 582. The Court addressed itself solely to the issue of short-term suspensions. Though Goss did not precisely define "suspension," the term was used in its
general educational sense, that is, a temporary compulsory exclusion from school and
educational exposure, as a penalty for objectionable behavior. It does not encompass
reassignments not involving exclusion from school attendance.
19. Id. at 581; see the Court's reaffirmation and general recognition of the princi(1975).
ple of enforceable students' rights in Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, -

20. OHIO

REV. CODE ANN.

§ 3313.64 (1972).

21. 419 U.S. at 573; see Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
22. 419 U.S. at 574.
23. Id. at 572-73. It is interesting to note that as early as 1874, the California
Supreme Court, in the context of an equal protection segregation case, stated that
attendance at a public school is a legal right just as a vested interest in property is a
legal right. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874) (upholding separate bift equal school
system).
24. 419 U.S. at 574-75, citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437
(1971).
25. 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
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the nature of the interest at stake." . . . [A]s long as a
property deprivation is not de minimus, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be taken of
the Due Process Clause."
A balancing test-weighing the interest of the student in uninterrupted education against the interest of the school system
in maintaining an environment conducive to learning-is relevant only to the kind of procedure due process requires, and not
to whether the right applies.2 7 Thus, writing for the majority,
Justice White concluded:
Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation,
which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure
the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.28
Justice Powell in his dissent agreed with the majority view
that a constitutionally protected interest may be created by an
independent source such as statutory law, 9 but he maintained
that a student's right to education must be demarcated by the
entire statutory package." Therefore, since the same Ohio law
which provided for free public education3 ' also authorized
school principals to suspend students for up to 10 days,32 Lopez
was not denied due process.
The Goss decision is the latest major development in a line
of Supreme Court cases establishing a continuum of protected
interests identified as "legitimate claims of entitlement." 3 Not
all claims and not all entitlements trigger the protections of the
due process clause. "[A] mere subjective 'expectancy' is
[not] protected by procedural due process."34 However, as the
26. 419 U.S. at 575-76.
27. Id. at 476-79.
28. Id. at 576.
29.

Id. at 586-87.

30. Id.
31. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.64 (1972).
32. Id. § 3313.66.
33. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (college teacher who lacked contractual and tenure "right"
to reemployment raised "genuine issue as to his interest in continued employment");
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parolee and society have interest in rehabilitation and "in treating the parolee with basic fairness"); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970) (welfare recipient has sufficient "entitlement" to benefits to require procedural due process).
34. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972).
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Court reaffirmed in Goss,35 a claim of entitlement may be engendered by "existing rules or understandings."3
A person's interest in a benefit is a "property" interest for
due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually
explicit understandings that support his claim of entitle:ment to the benefit and that he may invoke at the hearing.3

7

The Supreme Court's holding that students have a claim
of entitlement to education will have a substantial impact on
the nation's public school systems, since many state codes authorize suspensions without any provisions for a hearing.38 The
California Education Code, for example, authorizes suspension
by teachers for the day of class and the day following,3" suspension by principals for up to five school days,4" and suspension
or expulsion by the governing board,4 ' but until recently did not
provide for either a hearing or notice before suspension. Section
1060742 provides only that on or before the third day of the
suspension period the parent or guardian may attend a meeting
with school officials to discuss the reasons for the disciplinary
action. If the parent does not meet with school authorities, he
or she is notified by mail that the suspension has been imposed .3
This section was construed in Charles S. v. Board of
35. 419 U.S. at 572-73.
36. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
37. Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
38. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1516 (Supp. 1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
10-233 (1975); MICH. COMp. LAWS. ANN. § 340.613 (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. §
392.030 (1973); N.Y. EDUCATION LAW § 3214 (McKinney Supp. 1975); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3313.66 (1972). One commentator suggests that five percent of all public secondary school students may be suspended each year. Flygare, Short-Term Suspension
and the Requirement of Due Process, 3 J. LAW AND EDUC. 529, 531 (1974).
39. CA.L. EDUC. CODE § 10601 (West 1975).
40. Id. § 10601.5.
41. Id. § 10604.3. The statutory grounds for suspension include willful disobedience, habitual profanity, assault and battery upon another student or school personnel;
and threat of violence against school personnel; however, no student shall be suspended or expelled unless the conduct for which he or she is being disciplined is
directly related to school activity or to school attendance.
42. Id. § 10607; see George, Jr., Due Process in Protective Activities, 8 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 33, 45-50 (1968) (school administration). For recent changes in the expulsion procedure, see CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 967, 10608, 10609-09.4 (Deerings Adv. Legis.
Service No. 8, 1975).
43. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10607 (West 1975) provides in pertinent part:
On or before the third consecutive school day of any given period of
suspension, the parent or guardian of the pupil involved shall be asked
to attend a meeting with school officials, at which time the causes, the
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Education" as requiring something less than a full due process
hearing."5 The California Court of Appeal noted that a "hearing" was specified only in section 10608,6 which pertains to
expulsions; section 10607 uses the words "meeting" and "conference."4 7 The court reasoned that "such a radical change in
the wording of adjacent code sections 'cannot be deemed meaningless and without design.' "48 The court concluded that due
process requirements were met by the post-suspension notice
to the parents and by the post-suspension conference; a suspended student could present informal proof substantiating his
version of a disputed fact situation at the conference. 49
Other pre-Goss short suspension cases similarly have upheld the constitutionality of section 10607. In Baker v. Downey
5" which
City Board of Education,
concerned two students who
were suspended for 10 days and permanently removed from
their respective student-body and class offices for publishing
what was deemed a profane and vulgar off-campus newspaper,
a federal district court held that compliance with section 10607
satisfied the plaintiffs' administrative procedural rights.', In
duration, the school policy involved, and other matters pertinent to the
suspension, shall be discussed. If the parent or guardian fails to join in
such a conference, the school officials shall send him by mail a letter
stating the fact that suspension has been implemented and setting forth
all other data pertinent to the action.
For recent changes in the expulsion procedure, see id. §§ 967, 10608, 10609-09.4 (Deering's Adv. Legis. Service No. 8, 1975).
44. 20 Cal. App. 3d 83, 97 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1971), appeal dismissed for want of a
substantialfederalquestion sub nom. Strickland v. Bd. of Educ., 405 U.S. 1005 (1972).
45. Id. at 95, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 430. Quoting People v. Pennington, 66 Cal. 2d 508,
521, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374, 383, 426 P.2d 942, 951 (1967), the court defended a hearing as a
" 'proceeding where evidence is taken to the end of determining an issue of fact and a
decision made on the basis of that evidence.'"
46. 20 Cal. App. 3d at 94-96, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 10608
(West 1975) provided in pertinent part:
If a pupil is expelled from school, the parent or guardian of the pupil
may appeal to the county board of education which shall hold a hearing
thereon and render its decision.
This section was repealed and replaced by a new section 10608 which requires greatly
expanded procedural process. Id. (Deering's Adv. Legis. Service No. 8, 1975).
47. Charles S. v. Bd. of Educ., 20 Cal. App. 3d 83, 94-96, 97 Cal. Rptr. 422, 42930 (1971). See note 42 supra.
48. Charles S. v. Rd. of Educ., 20 Cal. App. 3d 83, 95, 97 Cal. Rptr. 422, 430
(1971), citing Ruiz v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 45 Cal. 2d 409, 413, 289 P.2d 229,
233 (1955).
49. Id. at 94, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
50. 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
51. Id. at 523. The court observed:
[I]f the temporary suspension of a high school student could not be
accomplished without first preparing specification of charges, giving nd-
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Noonan v. Green," the court of appeal impliedly also found
section 10607 to provide adequate procedural safeguards in a
short-suspension situation. 3
However, the permissive post-suspension notice and conference between parents and school officials will not comply
with the Goss minimum requirements. The student in California who must wait for the post-suspension conference before he
or she may tender an explanation for the alleged misconduct
is deprived of three days' school attendance; the Goss Court
held that any such deprivation, irrespective of the length, warrants due process protection. Absent an emergency, both notice
and a hearing must precede the suspension.5"
Three major problems remained unsolved by Goss to
plague school administrators. First, as Justice Powell's dissent
asked, to which other educational decisions might the Goss
procedural requisites extend?" Second, are school board trustees and administrators liable in damages if they fail to provide
adequate procedures? Third, what constitutes a procedurally
acceptable hearing?
Justice Powell suggested that, by the logic of the majority
tice of a hearing, and holding a hearing, or any combination of these
procedures, the discipline and ordered conduct of the educational program and the moral atmosphere required by good educational standards,
would be difficult to maintain.
Id. at 522-23.
52. 276 Cal. App. 2d 25, 80 Cal. Rptr. 513 (1969).
53. The Noonan court held that the trial court had no jurisdiction in the case
because of the failure of the parties to pursue the remedies provided by sections 10607
and 10608. The court confused the issue by referring to the meeting specified in section
10607 as a "hearing." Id. at 30-31, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
54. 419 U.S. at 582.
55. Id. at 597. Justice Powell suggested that Goss logically would apply to many
educational decisions:
Teachers and other school authorities are required to make many decisions that have serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, for
example, how to grade the student's work, whether a student passes or
fails a course, whether he is to be promoted, whether he is required to take
certain subjects, whether he may be excluded from interscholastic athletics or other extracurricular activities, whether he may be removed from
one school and sent to another, whether he may be bused long distances
when available schools are nearby, and whether he should be placed in a
"general," "vocational," or "college-preparatory" track.
In these and many similar situations claims of impairment of one's
educational entitlement identical in principle to those before the Court
today can be asserted with equal or greater justification. Likewise, in
many of these situations, the pupil can advance the same types of speculative and subjective injuries given critical weight in this case.
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opinion, such basic educational decisions as giving a student a
failing grade might affect the "broad range of interests"" accorded constitutional protection, as property rights.57 For some
indication of the probable scope of the Goss holding it is helpful
to look to the Roth line of cases which preceded Goss. In Board
of Regents v. Roth,5" the Supreme Court indicated the parameters of the expanding concept of property rights. Such rights
are not infinite.
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He
must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He
must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to
protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily
lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined. It
is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to
provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those
claims.
Property interests . . .are created and their dimen-

sions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law-rules
or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits.59
Thus, the college instructor in Roth did not have a claim of
entitlement because the terms of his contract specified that he
was hired for only one year,60 while the instructor in Perry v.
Sinderman6" did have a claim of entitlement based on his reliance on an alleged informal understanding at his college.
These cases also help define the parameters of the liberty
interest, the meaning of which "must be broad indeed." 2 The
instructor in Roth did not establish deprivation of a liberty
interest because he failed to show that his professional reputa63
tion was harmed when he was not rehired.
If a student's entitlement to an education, established by
Goss, is injured by action taken by school administrators, or if
the student can show harm to his reputation, Powell's fears
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
See note 54 supra.
408 U.S. 564 (1972).
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578.
408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972).
Bd.of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
Id. at 573-74.
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may be realized. Decisions which traditionally have been left
to the discretion of educators may now be subject to review in
the courts.
The answer to the second unresolved problem was given by
the Supreme Court in Wood v. Strickland,4 a case subsequent
to Goss which involved the suspension of two girls for spiking
the home economics class punch with malt liquor at a meeting
attended by parents and students. The Court held that a school
board trustee or administrator "must be held to a standard of
conduct based not only on permissible intentions, but also on
knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of
his charges. '"5 This holding overturned the traditional

common-law extension to school officials of qualified goodfaith immunity."6 In the context of school discipline, the
Strickland Court held, a school official who takes an action
which violates the constitutional rights of a student is liable for
damages under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 7
A major defect in the Goss decision is that the majority
failed to explicate precisely the components of a fair presuspension hearing. Who should conduct the hearing? Should
parents be afforded the opportunity to be present? Does the
student have a right to contest the charge against him? Do any
evidentiary rules apply?
The Goss Court seemed to indicate that very informal procedures are constitutionally adequate.
There need be no delay between the time "notice" is
given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority of
cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged
misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred68

A student need not be represented by counsel nor must he be
allowed to cross-examine witnesses. Furthermore, if the "informal discussion" the Court describes may be held "minutes"
after the offense occurred, and simultaneously with notice, parents obviously will be unable to be present at the hearing.
64. 420 U.S. 308, (1975) vacating Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186 (8th Cir.
1973), revg 348 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Ark. 1972).

65. Id. at 1001.
66. See Sweeney v. Young, 82 N.H. 159, 131 A. 155 (1925); Douglas v. Campbell,
89 Ark. 254, 116 S.W. 211 (1909).

67. 420 U.S. at 322, construing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 et seq. (1970).
68. 419 U.S. at 582.
69. Id. at 583.
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Again, it is useful to turn to the line of cases preceding
Goss for guidelines. 0 In Goldberg v. Kelly,7' the Supreme Court
ruled that basic procedural due process requires a hearing held
"'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,' "though
the exact procedural requirements may vary with the basic
circumstances:
"[Clonsideration of which procedures due process may
require under a given set of circumstances must begin with
a determination of the precise nature of the government
function involved as well as of the private
interest that has
'72
been affected by governmental action.
The Supreme Court has found in Goldberg v. Kelly and subsequent decisions in the Roth line that for persons facing deprivation of liberty or property, "meaningful manner" includes the
right to an impartial decisionmaker, 73 to a decision based on
rules and evidence, 74 and to a record which states the decisionmaker's reasons for his determinations and indicates the evidence he relied upon. 75 The nature of the interest at stake in
school disciplinary situations suggests that these requirements
may well apply to a pre-suspension hearing.
Ordinarily, a teacher or principal probably must be presumed to be impartial, 7 but whether a teacher or principal who
has just witnessed misconduct may function as an impartial
trier of fact is a question which some future court must resolve.
It is noteworthy, however, that in a pre-Goss case, Sullivan v.
7 7 the Fifth Circuit
Houston Independent School District,
Court
of Appeals ruled that someone other than the principal should
conduct the short-term suspension hearing if the principal's
70. Justice Powell, however, argued that "the relationship between a student
and teacher is manifestly different" from that involved in many of the noneducational
settings found in other Roth-line cases. 419 U.S. at 594 n.13.
71. 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1969), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965).
72. Id. at 263, quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
73. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
485-86 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1969). The Withrow Court stressed
that even the "probability of unfairness" should be avoided. 421 U.S. at 47.
74. See cases cited note 73 supra.
75. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 487 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 271 (1969).
76. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
77. 475 F.2d 1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 1973); see Hawkins v. Coleman, 376 F. Supp.
1330 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
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involvement was such that he could not be an impartial trier
of fact.
An additional source of guidelines for pre-suspension hearings may be found in recent California legislation enacting
standards for pre-expulsion hearings." The legislature recognized the importance of an impartial decisionmaker by providing that "the governing board may appoint an impartial administrative panel of three or more certificated employees of
the district, none of whom shall be on the staff of the school in
which the pupil is enrolled."79 The decision to expel a student
must be based upon substantial evidence. Although the technical rules of evidence need not be observed, only evidence upon
which reasonable persons are accustomed to rely may be admitted. 0 A reasonably accurate record must be made of the
proceedings."'
Although Goss may not require standards as stringent or
formal as those established by the California Legislature for
expulsion hearings, the liability which attends failure to develop adequate procedural safeguards for short-term suspension proceedings makes caution the wiser course.
PatriciaPaulson White
78. See CAL. EDuc.
vice No. 8, 1975).
79. Id. § 10608 (d).

80. Id. (f).
81.

Id. (e).

CODE

§§ 967, 10608, 10609-09.4 (Deering's Adv. Legis. Ser-

SEARCH AND SEIZURE-EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
JUSTIFY THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A SHARED
TRASH RECEPTACLE-People v. Parker, 44 Cal. App. 3d
222, 118 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1975).
On December 23, 1972, Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff Garcia
received an anonymous tip advising him that by calling a certain telephone number bets could be placed throughout the
country. The tip led to a three-month investigation which resulted in the arrest of defendant William Parker and other
persons involved in a bookmaking ring.'
During the course of the investigation Garcia and his deputies maintained surveillance of three residential apartments
in El Monte, California: 12132 Sitka, Apartment 18; 9918 Rio
Hondo Parkway, Apartment 15; and 5023 Rosemead Boulevard, Apartment 3. Numerous activities at these first two addresses reinforced the officers' suspicions that a bookmaking
ring was in operation.' The deputies also learned that defendant William Parker,3 known to the officers from previous
bookmaking arrests, was the lessee of the Rosemead apartment.4
1. People v. Parker, 44 Cal. App. 3d 222, 118 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1975). Deputy
Garcia estimated that the bookmaking ring consisted of 18 agents and 75 to 100 bettors.
Id. at 228, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
2. Id. at 224-27, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 525-27. The investigation began after Garcia
traced the telephone number to the Rio Hondo apartment. Garcia maintained surveillance of that apartment from December 27, 1972, through March 7, 1973, and noticed
that Alvin Lingo followed a consistent pattern in using the apartment when the local
tracks were open. The pattern consisted of Lingo leaving his home at 9:00 a.m., driving
to a liquor store and purchasing a National Daily Reporter, and then proceeding to
the apartment where he would remain until 6:30 p.m.
Garcia also observed Jacob and Pat Jackson at the Rio Hondo apartment and
learned that the Jacksons were leasing an apartment on Sitka in El Monte. The deputy
further learned from the telephone company that between January 4, 1973, and February 2, 1973, hundreds of calls were made from the Sitka apartment telephone to the
Turfmaster Wire Service, which informs subscribers of the latest horse racing results.
On February 5, 1973, Garcia observed Mr. Jackson in a bar collecting bets and making
payoffs to various patrons. During the course of the surveillance at the Sitka address,
Garcia noticed James Registar, a bookmaker who had a previous arrest record, used
the Sitka apartment in a manner similar to Alvin Lingo's use of the Rio Hondo Parkway apartment. Id.
3. On February 7, 1973, Parker was seen in a meat market, a bar, and a bowling
alley talking about horse racing with people who would point to a copy of the National
Daily Reporter, after which Parker would write something down. At the conclusion of
each conversation either Parker or his female companion would place a call on a pay
phone. Id. at 226-27, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
4. Id. at 226, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 526-27. The affidavit from which the court summa-
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On February 21, 1973, at 6:30 p.m., Garcia observed Lingo
and Registar, both of whom were thought to be part of the ring,
leave the Sitka apartment. Registar was carrying a green plastic bag which he placed in a large refuse receptacle at the side
of the apartment complex. The bin was used by about 60 people in the 19-unit apartment building. Garcia proceeded to the
trash bin without a warrant and retrieved the green trash bag.5
Inside he found incriminating evidence' from which he concluded that the Sitka and Rio Hondo apartments were being
used to conduct bookmaking activities.7 Garcia discovered Parker's name, address, and telephone number in the records recovered from the trash, and materials connecting him with 12
bets.'
Several weeks later, on the basis of the information gathered during the three-month investigation, Deputy Garcia secured a warrant which authorized the search of defendant's
residence. The search uncovered additional incriminating evidence in Parker's apartment. Parker was arrested and charged
with conspiracy9 and bookmaking activities. 0
At the preliminary hearing, defendant's motion to quash
the warrant was denied on the grounds that the warrantless
search of the trash can did not violate the fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
rized the facts did not indicate how or why the officers were led to the Rosemead
address. Id. at 226 n.6, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 526 n.6.
5. Id. at 227, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 527. Had the officers decided to leave and secure
a warrant, they would have been able to identify the bag on their return since the
receptacle contained only one green bag.
6. Garcia found 10 daily tally sheets, 80 slips of paper showing payoffs on winning
horses, 10 National Daily Reporters-allmarked, 49 slips of paper showing weekly owes
to bettors, 12 slips of paper showing daily owes and pays to agents, 106 pieces of paper
showing monies bet on each race at Santa Anita, and a telephone bill for a special tollfree number installed at 9918 Rio Hondo Parkway. Id. at 227-28, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
7. Garcia formed his opinion on the basis of his expertise as a bookmaking vice
officer. Id. at 228, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28.
8. Id. at 228, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
9. CAL. PEN. CODE § 182 (West 1970) provides in part:
If two or more persons conspire:
1. To commit any crime

. . .

they shall be punishable by imprisonment

in the county jail for not more than one year or in the state prison for not
more than three years, or by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars
($5,000) or both.
10. CAL. PEN. CODE § 337a (West 1970) provides in part:
Every person . . . [w]ho lays, makes, offers or accepts any bet or bets

• . . is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not
more than one year or in the state prison for a period not exceeding two
years.
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magistrate further found that even if the search of the trash can
was improper, there existed sufficient evidence from other
sources to justify the issuance of the warrant." The defendant
appealed to the superior court on a 995 motion 2 to have the
information set aside. The superior court granted the motion,
holding that the People had presented no evidence that a warrant to search the receptacle could not have been obtained. 3
The People did not raise the issue of whether the affidavit
contained independent information to support the warrant if
the trash can material were excised.
On appeal from the superior court decision," the California Court of Appeal ruled that the magistrate had been given
enough information apart from the trash can material to justify
issuing the warrant. 5 The opinion cited the officer's expertise
and the detailed eighteen page affidavit as furnishing the necessary probable cause.'"
Although the ruling on the affidavit was sufficient to decide the case, the Parker court felt compelled to address itself
to the issue of the search of the trash can with probable cause"
but without a warrant."' The history of the trash can cases
began in 1969 when the California Supreme Court in People v.
11.
12.

44 Cal. App. 3d at 229, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 995 (West 1970) provides in part:
The indictment or information must be set aside by the court

If it be an information:
1. That before filing thereof the defendant had not been legally
committed by a magistrate.
13. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 229, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 528-29.
14. Since the People did not raise before the superior court the issue of the search
warrant's validity minus the information obtained from the trash can, the defendants
claimed that the question could not be raised on appeal. However, the court of appeal
cited People v. Maltz, 14 Cal. App. 3d 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1971), for the proposition
that the People could raise any issue before the court of appeal that was presented to
and decided by the magistrate at the preliminary hearing, even though the superior
court, on appeal, was not asked to decide that issue. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 229, 118 Cal.
Rptr. at 529.
15. Id. at 229, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
16. Id.; see People v. Benjamin, 71 Cal. 2d 296, 455 P.2d 438, 78 Cal. Rptr. 510
(1969), where the California Supreme Court upheld an affidavit in a fact situation
similar to Parker.
17. The magistrate at the preliminary hearing, the trial court, and the court of
appeal indicated that there was probable cause for the search of the trash can. 44 Cal.
App. 3d at 229 n.8, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 529 n.8.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
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Edwards'9 invalidated the warrantless search of a residential
homeowner's trash can which was within a few feet of his back
door. The Edwards court cited Katz v. United States" for the
proposition that the fourth amendment protects people, not
places, and that wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free from governmental intrusion.21 The Edwards court concluded that the
defendant had exhibited an expectation of privacy and that the
expectation was reasonable under the circumstances of the
case.22 The court further stated:
We can readily ascribe many reasons why residents would
not want their castaway clothing, letters, medicine bottles
or other tell-tale refuse and trash to be examined by neighbors or others, at least not until the trash had lost its
identity and meaning by becoming part of a conglomeration of trash elsewhere. Half truths leading to rumor and
gossip may readily flow from an attempt to "read" the
contents of another's trash.n
Two years later, the same court in People v. Krivda24 extended the Edwards rationale and declared illegal the warrantless search of a trash can which a homeowner had placed on the
sidewalk for collection. The people had argued removing trash
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or things to be seized.
Although the primacy of the warrant requirement is not entirely settled, see plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971), in general all searches and seizures by agents of the state are deemed
unreasonable under the fourth amendment if conducted without a warrant unless they
fall into those categories of recognized exceptions; consent-Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); searches incident to arrest-Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); stop and frisk-Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); hot pursuit-Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); impounded autos-Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967); open field searches-Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924); abandoned
property-Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); emergency situationsSchmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); car searches-cf. Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970).
19. 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
20. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
21. People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1103, 458 P.2d 713, 717, 80 Cal. Rptr.
633, 637 (1969), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
22. Id. at 1104, 458 P.2d at 718, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
23. Id.
24. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded
sub. nom. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), opn. reinstated, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504
P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973). On remand, the
California Supreme Court determined that the state constitution provided grounds for
its decision and reinstated its original opinion on that basis.
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to the sidewalk for collection was an abandonment of one's
trash to the police or the general public. 5 The Krivda court
noted, however, that many municipalities have enacted ordinances which restrict the right to haul away trash to licensed
collectors and prohibit unauthorized persons from tampering
with trash containers."6 The Krivda court indicated that it was
reluctant to encourage the police to search citizens' trash without a warrant."
Nevertheless, in a 1973 decision, People v. Dumas," the

California Supreme Court distinguished Krivda and upheld
the warrantless search of a car parked in front of the defendant's home. The Dumas court accepted the analogy between
a trash can and an automobile,29 but indicated that the Krivda
decision did not preclude a valid warrantless search of a trash
can upon a proper showing of probable cause. 0 The Dumas
court further pointed out that trash cans, like cars and parcels
consigned to common carriers," may be searched without a
warrant if the requirements of United States v. Carroll" are
25. 5 Cal. 3d at 365, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
26. Id. at 366, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
27. Id. at 367, 486 P.2d at 1269, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
28. 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1973).
29. Id. at 884, 512 P.2d at 1217, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 313. The Dumas decision
established a three-level hierarchy of fourth amendment protection, depending upon
the nature of the place to be searched. Homes and offices are to be accorded all but
absolute protection from warrantless searches. Cars and trash cans, because of an
individual's lesser expectation of privacy, may be searched upon probable cause if it
can be shown that it was impractical for the police to secure a warrant. Other places
may be searched without a warrant if the defendant had not exhibited a reasonable
expectation of privacy. Id. at 882-83, 512 P.2d at 1216-17, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 312-13.
30. The Dumas court concluded that the affidavit in the Krivda case did not
meet the test set out in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 9 Cal. 3d at 884, 512
P.2d at 1217, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 313.
31. People v.McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 899, 500 P.2d 1097, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1972).
The McKinnon decision upheld the warrantless search of cartons which were in the
hands of an airline on the grounds of exigent circumstances. The McKinnon case can
be distinguished from Parkerin three respects: first, in McKinnon the defendants were
ready to board an airplane which was preparing to fly out of the jurisdiction; second,
the cartons in McKinnon were not resting on private property but had been consigned
to a common carrier for transportation to a remote destination; finally, the cartons
were being used for an illegal purpose in that they contained contraband, not mere
evidence. Id. at 911, 500 P.2d at 1105, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 905. In Parkerthe trash was
still on private property and not yet in the trash truck; the defendants were not in the
process of fleeing the area; and the trash on the night in question was not being used
for an illegal purpose: it was evidence and not contraband. See 44 Cal. App. 3d at 22329, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 525-28.
32. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The Carroll Court summed up the doctrine this way:
[Tihe guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by
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met: existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances
33
which render the obtaining of a warrant impractical.
Against this background, the Parker court upheld the
34
warrantless search of the trash can. It is interesting to note
that the Parkercourt never stated that apartment dwellers who
place their trash in a common receptacle do not enjoy the protection of the fourth amendment with respect to that trash.
While Edwards and Krivda invalidated warrantless searches of
private homeowners' trash bins, the California Supreme Court
has never decided whether an apartment dweller who shares a
common receptacle has the same reasonable expectation of privacy. 5 Had the Parkercourt concluded that an apartment resident has no reasonable expectation of privacy, it would have
been unnecessary to determine what exigent circumstances are
sufficient to support a warrantless search, since there would
have been no fourth amendment rights to protect. Therefore,
by implication, the court assumed the existence of a protectable right and addressed itself to the task of evaluating the
exigent circumstances of the search.
The court listed the characteristics of a trash can which
ordinarily would render the securing of a warrant impractical:
first, the materials in a trash can are placed there for removal
and thus are highly portable; second, trespassory incursions
into exterior trash receptacles by human and animal foragers
are not totally unexpected; finally, people are not particularly
careful in making sure that the contents of the trash can will
the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a
search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a search of a ship,
motorboat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not
practical to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality.
Id. at 153.
33. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 884, 512 P.2d 1208, 1217-18, 109 Cal. Rptr.
304, 313-14 (1973).
34. See note 17 supra.
35. In both Edwards and Krivda the trash cans belonged to residential homeowners. In People v. Stewart, 34 Cal. App. 3d 695, 110 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1973), the court
indicated that an apartment dweller might have a lesser expectation of privacy with
respect to his trash bin than a homeowner. However, the Stewart court never resolved
this issue and decided the case on other grounds. Id. at 700, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 230. Since
the Parker decision, the California Court of Appeal has concluded that communal
Cal.
trash receptacles are protected by the fourth amendment. People v. Smith, n.5, 125 Cal. Rptr. 192, 197 n.5 (1975).
App. 3d -
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not be damaged by the weather." The court stated that since
most trash cans share these common characteristics, the People would need to show only minimal additional facts to justify
a warrantless search of a trash receptacle.
While the Dumas decision indicated in dictum that trash
placed on a sidewalk for collection37 may be searched without
a warrant upon probable cause,38 at least when officers have
reason to fear the imminent arrival of garbage collection
trucks,39 the Parkercourt concluded that Deputy Garcia faced
no such emergency." Consequently, the court had to find other
exigent circumstances which rendered the securing of a warrant impractical. It found three: the sudden unexpected nature
of the discovery; the communal character of the trash receptacle, which increased chances of tampering or weather damage;
and the fact that procuring and serving a warrant in the midst
of an ongoing investigation involving numerous suspects might
prevent successful completion of the operation.4
The court first noted that the officers came upon the trash
unexpectedly.42 Thus, the police were not in a situation where
they knew ahead of time the location and the nature of the area
to be searched but for some reason failed to get judicial approval. 3 However, the mere fact that the officers discovered the
evidence inadvertently does not automatically mean that it
was impractical to obtain a warrant. The People must still
demonstrate that the overall circumstances are such that the
evidence may be destroyed or removed from the reach of the
36.

44 Cal. App. 3d at 230, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 529.

37. The court declined to attach any significance to the fact that the trash bin
was located next to the exterior premises. Id. The court stated that an analogy with
automobile search cases was appropriate, and noted that searches of vehicles have
been upheld where the car was parked at the curb or adjacent to the defendant's
apartment, id. at 231, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 530, apparently on the theory that the very
nature of a trash can, like the inherent mobility of an automobile, tends to make
securing a warrant impractical. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 48 (1970); cf.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
38. See note 30 supra.
39. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 884, 512 P.2d 1208, 1217, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304,
313 (1973), discussing People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62
(1971), vacated and remanded sub. nom. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), opn.
reinstated,8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
919 (1973).
40. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 230, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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officers if a search is not carried out immediately.44
The Parker court also indicated concern that the contents
of the trash can would be tampered with or damaged by the
weather, and noted that these chances were increased since
many people regularly used the receptacle.45 Yet there was no
showing of inclement weather, nor that the apartment complex
was located in an area where tampering with trash was likely
to be more than a remote possibility. Since the material the
officers were interested in was in a plastic bag, the chances that
the evidence would be damaged by rain, blown away by the
wind, or damaged by other garbage in the bin were small. At
the time the trash was placed in the receptacle, there was only
one green plastic bag." Consequently, it would have been easy
for the officers to identify the bag had they decided to secure a
warrant.
Finally, the court noted that any effort to obtain a warrant
could have resulted in the premature disclosure of the ongoing
investigation to the potential defendants, thereby preventing
its successful completion.47 The opinion gives no explanation as
to how this might happen and as a result of the omission, we
must speculate. One possible interpretation is that even
though the deputies did not have to serve a warrant on anybody
in order to search the trash bin,48 they probably would have
been required to give a receipt to Registar for the property
taken,4" since it was his trash that was seized. Had Registar
received such a receipt, it is reasonable to assume that he
would have called defendant Parker and other persons in the
ring, alerting them to possible police action and warning them
to destroy any incriminating evidence in their possession.
44. See People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 884-85, 512 P.2d 1208, 1218, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 304, 314 (1973).
45. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 230, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
46. Id. at 227, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
47. Id. at 230, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
48. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1528 (West 1970) which provides in part:
If the magistrate is thereupon satisfied . . . that there is probable cause
. . . he must issue a warrant . . . to a peace officer in his county commanding him forthwith to search the person or place named for the property or things specified . . ..
49. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1535 (West 1970) provides:
When the officer takes property under the warrant, he must give a receipt
for the property taken (specifying it in detail) to the person from whom
it was taken by him, or in whose possession it was found; or, in the
absence of any person, he must leave it in the place where he found the
property.
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However, in People v. Phillips,5" the California Court of Appeal
held that the receipt requirement imposed by the Penal Code
was ministerial in nature, and the fact that officers did not
issue one did not void the warrant or contaminate for evidentiary purposes the property received under the warrant. Therefore, it is unclear what the court had in mind when it listed
danger to the investigation in progress as an exigent circumstance supporting the search of the trash bin.
Although the Parker court found the search justified by
exigent circumstances, the court's unarticulated conclusion
seems to be that 60 people who share a trash bin do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy as to that bin. The communal nature of the trash receptacle is continually stressed,5'
and it would appear that the court might have preferred to deal
straightforwardly with that issue. The difficulty with deciding
the case using an expectation of privacy analysis is that the
court would have become involved in the complicated task of
determining at what numerical point individuals lose fourth
amendment protection with respect to shared trash."
The significance of Parker is that the court places a light
burden on the People in justifying warrantless searches of trash
cans upon probable cause. In addition, the court has sidestepped the difficult question of when and to what extent
apartment owners have a reasonable expectation that their
trash will not be searched by the police without a warrant.
There may well be future cases where it will be difficult for the
People to make an exigent circumstances argument and it will
be for those cases to decide the expectation of privacy issue.5
Robert F. Wall
50. 163 Cal. App. 2d 541, 548, 329 P.2d 621, 625 (1958).
51. 44 Cal. App. at 230-31, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 529-30.
52. The prosecution would probably point out that the commingling of one's
trash with another's exposes that trash to a greater risk of being tampered with or
damaged and, therefore, one's expectation of privacy is not reasonable under the
circumstances. The defense would argue that since the expectation of a homeowner is
that his garbage will be destroyed and not inspected by the government or its licensee,
then an apartment dweller should not have to assume a greater risk of a warrantless
search because that individual must of necessity share his trash receptacle.
53. Since the Parker decision, the California Court of Appeal has concluded that
communal trash receptacles are within the ambit of the fourth amendment. People v.
Smith, Cal. App. 3d -'
n.5, 125 Cal. Rptr. 192, 197 n.5 (1975). See note
35 supra.

INVERSE CONDEMNATION-THE SAN FRANCISCO
BAY PLAN IS A GENERAL PLAN AND DESIGNATION OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE PURSUANT TO
THE PLAN IS NOT INVERSE CONDEMNATION-Navajo
Terminals, Inc. v. San FranciscoBay Conservation and Development Commission, 46 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108
(1975).
On November 18, 1971, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) adopted the San
Francisco Bay Plan. The plan consisted of a detailed analysis
of the Bay and land use recommendations by the BCDC for the
Bay and its shoreline.' Among the parcels designated for specific uses was a tract owned by Navajo Terminals, Inc. (Navajo), including a 500-foot frontage on the U.S. Tidal Canal in
San Francisco Bay. The 1971 BCDC Bay Plan designated the
Navajo land for use as a public waterfront park;' its designation was not modifiable except by the legislature.3
Navajo thereafter filed an action for damages, alleging
that the BCDC action constituted inverse condemnation.' The
BCDC's demurrer was sustained without leave to amend. 5
On appeal Navajo argued that the mere designation of its
land as a water-orientated public park constituted a taking of
private property without just compensation, even though there
1. The San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC)
was created in 1965 by the California Legislature, CAL. Gov'T CODE § 66600 et seq
(West 1966), as a temporary planning agency, id. § 66604, charged with the task of
preparing an extensive study of the Bay, id. § 66603. BCDC was also given the power
to issue and deny permits to place material in or remove material from the Bay. Id.
§ 66604. In 1969, the BCDC submitted the initial draft of the San Francisco Bay Plan
to the legislature, with recommendations for actions to be taken by the legislature.
As a result of the study, the legislature established the BCDC as a permanent
agency in 1969, id. § 66659 (West Supp. 1975), with jurisdiction over the Bay and its
shoreline extending one hundred feet inland from the mean high tide, id. § 66610.
The permanent BCDC was authorized to issue or deny permits to build, fill the Bay,
dredge, or make any change in the use of any land, water, or structure within BCDC
jurisdiction. Id. § 66632.
2. Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
46 Cal. App. 3d 1, 3, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
3. Id. at 3, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 109. Subsequent amendments delegated the power
of modification to BCDC.
4. An action for inverse condemnation is a derivative of the eminent domain
action instituted by a government body. It is available in California both statutorily,
CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 243.1 (West 1966), and at common law. See, e.g., Sheffet v. Los
Angeles County, 3 Cal. App. 3d 720, 84 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1970).
5. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 2, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
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was no indication that any public entity would begin condemnation proceedings in the forseeable future. Specifically, Navajo attempted to show that the San Francisco Bay Plan as
passed by the BCDC was something more than just a general
plan.' Navajo contended that the Bay Plan was analogous to a
zoning ordinance by the BCDC, 7 and that the plan's designation of the property as a public park was an unreasonable restriction on Navajo's use of its land. However, the court in
Navajo found that the Bay Plan was a general plan and held
that Selby Realty Co. v. City of Buenaventura' was "dispositive of Navajo's contention that BCDC's action constituted a
taking." 9 The court also concluded that since Navajo alleged
no action by the BCDC other than the adoption of the plan,
all other issues were premature.'"
It is the determination that the San Francisco Bay Plan is
a general plan that is the essence of the court's decision. Construed as part of a general plan, the BCDC's classification of
Navajo's land is a mere designation of a potential public use
and not a taking compensable in damages.
6. The general plan is an intra-governmental tool for municipal land-use planning. It is important to note that the general plan has essentially no effect until
implemented. See D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
§ 17 (1971). "The general plan is a comprehensive, long-range policy guide for development of the city as a whole." Id. at 42.
7. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 4, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 109.
8. 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
9. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 4, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 109. The Navajo court reiterated the
policy grounds set out in Selby:
If a governmental entity and its responsible officials were held subject to
a claim for inverse condemnation merely because a parcel of land was
designated for potential public use on one of these several authorized
plans, the process of community planning would either grind to a halt,
or deteriorate to publication of vacuous generalizations regarding the
future use of land. We indulge in no hyperbole to suggest that if every
land owner whose property might be affected at some vague and distant
future time by any of these legislatively permissible plans was entitled
to bring an action in declaratory relief to obtain a judicial declaration as
to the validity and potential effect of the plan upon his land, the courts
of this state would be inundated with futile litigation. It is clear, under
all the circumstances, that plaintiff has not stated a cause of action
against the county defendants for either declaratory relief or inverse condemnation.
Id., quoting Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d at 120-21, 514
P.2d at 117-18, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 805-06 (1973).
10. Id. at 5, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 110. The issues that the court concluded were
premature were whether a waterfront park was a legitimate land-use objective,
whether the designation created an impermissible island, and whether the public gain
from the use of the park would be grossly disproportionate to the economic loss Navajo
would sustain by the designation. Id.
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Had the court construed the Bay Plan as a zoning ordinance, it would have been necessary to examine the reasonableness of the restriction on Navajo's land uses." The court
rejected the zoning analogy, however, and relied on Selby,
which held that a property owner may not recover in inverse
condemnation merely because a municipality has indicated
through a general plan that it may eventually take the land.2
The plaintiff in Selby owned one parcel of land within the
city and another parcel solely under the jurisdiction of the
County of Ventura. The city and the county, prior to the initiation of the action, had adopted a joint general plan, including
a proposed circulation element for guiding the growth of
streets. The plan proposed an extension of a city street directly
through the plaintiff's city land and partially through the
county land. In 1970 the plaintiff applied to the city for a
building permit to erect a series of multi-unit dwellings. The
building plans showed that the proposed dwellings would be
located partially on the land intended to be used for the extension of the street. The city denied the permit, allegedly because
of the failure of the plaintiff to dedicate land for the street to
the city."
Selby contended that the county's adoption of a general
plan amounted to a taking of his property. The supreme court
dismissed this assertion and held that a land owner cannot
claim that his property has been taken without compensation
merely because the general plan of an area indicates that sometime in the future it may be taken for public use. The court
11. Had the Navajo court accepted the zoning analogy and directly confronted
the issue of the reasonableness of the restriction imposed, the disposition of the case
would have turned on the fact that the governmental regulation involved did not
merely restrict the range of potential uses, but rather zoned the property to be taken
by the state.
The fact that the Bay Plan designated the land to be taken, leaving Navajo no
possible use, is critical in light of the California Supreme Court's recent decision in
HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975),
which held that oppressive zoning ordinances that reduce the value of the property
affected but do not preclude all possible uses do not give rise to inverse condemnation
actions; the only remedy available is a writ of mandate allowing no damages.
Of particular importance to the issues presented in Navajo is footnote 14 of the
HFH case, in which the supreme court said, "Neither Selby nor this case [HFH]
presents the distinct problems arising from inequitable zoning actions undertaken by
a public agency as a prelude to public acquisition." Id. at 517 n.14, 542 P.2d at 243
n.14, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 371 n.14. The court did not reach the issues presented in Navajo.
12. Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111,
109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
13. Id. at 115-16, 514 P.2d at 114, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
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stressed the clear public and legislative policy in favor of rational planning, and the tentative, uncertain nature of the general plan. 4
Declining to recognize any distinctions between a local
5
general plan and the San Francisco Bay Plan, the court in
Navajo rejected as inapplicable two other cases, Kopping v.
City of Whittier" and Candlestick Properties,Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission."'
Navajo argued that the designation of its property as a
future publicly owned water park would oppressively and unnecessarily extend the period of time between the beginning of
the taking process and the actual taking. It asserted that in this
case, the taking process began with the adoption of the San
8
Francisco Bay Plan by the BCDC. In Kopping, the California
Supreme Court held that excessive pre-condemnation publicity" which affects the market value of the property to be condemned must be considered in determining the appropriate
compensation for the land, and that any decrease in the market
value caused by such publicity is chargeable to the municipality attempting to condemn the property. Further, if the condemning entity unnecessarily delays the eminent domain pro0
ceedings, the land owner may sue in inverse condemnation."
The court in Navajo, however, concluded that since the San
Francisco Bay Plan announced by the BCDC was only a general plan, no taking process had begun, and that Selby dis2
posed of any allegation supported by Klopping. '
Navajo's alternative contention was that the BCDC action
14. 'Id. at 118-21, 514 P.2d at 115-18, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 804-06.
15. See note 32 and accompanying text infra.
16. 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).
17. 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970).
18. See Brief for Appellant at 9, Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 46 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975), and
Appellant's Reply Brief at 4, id.
19. "Pre-condemnation publicity," as used by the Klopping court, means public
actions taken by the condemnor prior to the statutory date (CAL. CIv. PRo. CODE § 1249
(West Supp. 1975)) for determination of the market value of the property. 8 Cal. 3d
at 44, 500 P.2d at 134, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
20. 8 Cal. 3d at 52, 500 P.2d at 1355, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
21. The court in Navajo stated, "Selby made clear that Kopping was no support
for a claim that planning designations constitute takings." 46 Cal. App. 3d at 4, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 109. Although the court does not indicate exactly what language in Selby
it relied on to dismiss Kopping, the following language from the Selby opinion is a
reasonable indication:
Neither Klopping nor any other decision of which we are aware holds that
the enactment of a general plan for the future development of an area,
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should be treated as the equivalent of a zoning ordinance which
created an undue restriction on Navajo's land." It argued that
the designation of the tract as a waterfront park restricted
potential use of the land and in fact took the property from
Navajo by imposing a restraint on its ability to use the land
effectively. 3 For this proposition it relied on dictum in
Candlestick Properties.4
Candlestick involved a property owner whose parcel of
land was partially submerged at high tide by the Bay, thereby
falling within the jurisdiction of the Hunters Point Reclamation District.25 The district was a state body created in 1955 by
the legislature for the purpose of reclaiming non-navigable submerged land in the Hunters Point area. Candlestick Properties
applied for a permit from the BCDC to fill the land. The permit
was denied and Candlestick brought suit.26
The appellate court, after determining that the legislation
creating the BCDC superseded the earlier legislation creating
the Hunters Point Reclaimation District,2 rejected Candlestick's contention that the permit refusal by the BCDC created
an undue restriction on the use of the land. The court agreed
that undue use-restrictions on private property were as much
a taking for constitutional purposes as destruction of the land;
but it found that in light of the need for rational planning and
the clear legislative intent to preserve the Bay, this particular
action did not constitute an undue restriction."
The Navajo court dismissed the assertion that the Bay
Plan created an unreasonable restriction on Navajo's land,
apparently on the same grounds that it disposed of the
Klopping argument." The court's determination that the San
Francisco Bay Plan constitutes a general plan and thus falls
within the Selby rule is conclusive as to the "reasonableness"
issue left open by Candlestick.3"
indicating potential public uses of privately owned land, amounts to
inverse condemnation of that land.
10 Cal. 3d at 119, 514 P.2d at 116, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 804.
22. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 5, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
23. See Brief for Appellant at 10, Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 46 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
24. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 562, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
25. Id. at 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 563-64, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
28. Id. at 572, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
29. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
30. See Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
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The significance of Navajo is the court's extension of the
Selby rule3 by its failure to distinguish between the San Francisco Bay Plan created by the BCDC and the general plan
created by Ventura County in Selby. A comparative analysis
of the enabling statutes for the BCDC and those under which
Ventura County had planned Selby's property reveals that the
Navajo court could have distinguished the plans" by focusing
on the difference in flexibility. This distinction can be seen
primarily in two ways: first, the flexible nature of the general
plan as a planning tool is not evident in the BCDC scheme; and
secondly, the method of implementation of the Bay Plan is
significantly more rigid than is characteristic of a general plan.
General plans by nature are tentative. They are continually updated by the planning commissions33 and the councils34
of the municipality involved. A general plan may include plans
for property outside the incorporated limits of the municipality."8 Further, general plans accomodate most if not all possible
land uses.3" The flexibility of the general plan is a necessary
element because its purpose is primarily to serve as a planning
tool within the governmental structure.
The rigidity of the Bay Plan is to some extent a function
of the fact that, once submitted, it could be modified only by
the legislature. 7 Further, both the extent of the BCDC's jurisdiction" and the number of possible land uses it could incorpoComm'n, 46 Cal. App. 3d 1, 5, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108, 110 (1975). The court stated that
Navajo had made no allegations that would bring it within the Candlestick rule.
However, in sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, the court noted that
"filn this situation Navajo could not allege facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action," which strongly suggests that the Candlestick argument offers little hope to any
plaintiff whose land has been designated for public use pursuant to a general plan. Id.
at 6, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 110 (emphasis added). Thus, while acknowledging the
Candlestick principle, the court appears to have tacitly reduced its value in cases
involving a general plan to near-zero.
31. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
32. Compare CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 66600 et seq. (West Supp. 1975) (creating the
BCDC) with id. § 65100 et seq. (authorizing local planning), and id. § 65800 et seq.
(enabling local governments to zone).
33. See id. § 65101.
34. See id. § 65350.
35. Id. § 65300.
36. Id. § 65302(a).
37. Id. § 66611 (West Supp. 1972) (subsequently modified to allow the BCDC to
amend and modify of its own accord). The court dismissed this as irrelevant, noticing
that the plan was at all times modifiable by the legislature. 46 Cal. App. 3d at 4, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 109.
38. It should be noted that the BCDC has the power to relinquish jurisdiction of
areas which it feels are of no regional importance to the Bay. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
66610(b) (West Supp. 1975).
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rate in the plan are severely limited.3 9
The second illustration of the lack of flexibility of the Bay
Plan, as compared with a general plan, is the difference in the
methods of implementation. Land use control involving a general plan is a two-step process. The planning and the implementation of these controls are two distinct actions,40 with the
implementation by a city or county normally accomplished
through zoning regulations4 ' and eminent domain proceedings.4" Until recently,43 no statute required that a general plan
ever be implemented. As the supreme court pointed out in
Selby, the relationship between the general plan and the implementation of that plan is tentative at best.
The code is less specific as to the implementation of a
general plan. Prior to 1971, it provided only that the planning agency should make recommendations and reports to
the legislative body and consult with others regarding implementation of the plan, and that legislative bodies are
required to give consideration to conformity with the general plan in the acquisition or abandonment of property or
the construction of public works."
The San Francisco Bay Plan, however, is simultaneously
a general plan and an implementation of that plan. Once the
plan was approved by the legislature 5 no further resolution was
required by either the legislature or the BCDC before the
BCDC became authorized to regulate the land within its jurisdiction.4" The planning-implementation distinction which was
key in Selby, does not exist in the Navajo situation.
The distinction between the flexibility of a local general
39. The seven possible uses for which BCDC may designate land include ports,
airports, water related industries, wildlife refuges, water orientated recreation areas,
desalinization plants, and power plants requiring large amounts of water for cooling
purposes. Id. § 66602.
40. Compare id. § 65101 (authorizing local planning) with id. § 65850 (zoning
enabling section for municipalities).
41. Id. § 65850.
42. Id. § 40404.
43. The state legislature recently passed legislation requiring all city and county
zoning ordinances to be consistent with the general plan of their area by January 1,
1974. Id. § 65860. This legislation was not in effect at the time Navajo was filed.
44. 10 Cal. 3d at 116, 514 P.2d at 115, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 803 (citations omitted).
45. Local general plans must also be approved by the legislative body of the
locality involved. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65359 (West Supp. 1975). But this action in no
way implies implementation, which must come through the independent act of passing
a zoning ordinance or beginning an eminent domain proceeding. Id. § 65860.
46. The BCDC may issue or deny permits solely on the basis of conformity to
the Bay Plan. See id. §§ 66604, 66605, 66632.5, and 66653.

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

plan and the rigidity of the San Francisco Bay Plan, as revealed by basic differences in enabling statutes and methods
of implementation, created an alternative for the court. That
alternative would have been to recognize those distinctions,
hold Selby inapplicable, and compensate the loss that Navajo
47
suffered as a result of the BCDC action.
Instead, the court held that the Bay Plan was a general
plan. The effect of its ruling could be far-reaching. First, and
most concretely, the power of the BCDC was clarified and
strengthened by the decision. 48 If a land-use designation in the
San Francisco Bay Plan does not constitute a taking or an
injury to property even when the plan designates that the property should be taken eventually, then no land owner within
BCDC jurisdiction can raise a claim against it until a use permit has been denied or some other independent regulatory act
has occurred. Certainly, the holding precludes actions against
the BCDC for money lost through decline in the market value
of property within BCDC jurisdiction caused by land use clas49
sification pursuant to the San Francisco Bay Plan.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Navajo may have
an effect on the disposition of cases arising under Government
Code section 65860, which provides in part that by January 1,
1974, all zoning ordinances in the state of California must comply with the general plans that exist in the area." Navajo
speaks strongly for the proposition that a municipality can
47. Navajo estimated the pre-plan value of its land, which it claimed was reduced to zero, at $150,000. Complaint at 4, Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco
Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 46 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
48. This is evidenced in part by the fact that the BCDC specifically requested
that the opinion of the court be published. Respondents Answer to Petition for Rehearing and Request for Publication at 3-5, Navajo Terminals, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 46 Cal. App. 3d 1, 120 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1975).
49. Recovery for this type of loss is difficult, at best, even if it is attempted under
normal zoning regulations. See VAN ALSTYNE, JUST COMPENSATION OF INTANGIBLE DETRIMENT: CRITERIA FOR LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATIONS IN CALIFORNIA, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 491
(1968).
50. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West Supp. 1975) provides in part:
a) County or city zoning ordinances shall be consistent with the general
plan of the county or city by Jan. 1, 1974. A zoning ordinance shall be
consistent with a city or county general plan only if:
i) The city . . . has adopted such a plan and
ii) The various land uses authorized by the ordinance are compatible
with the objectives .
specified in such a plan.
c) In the event that a zoning ordinance becomes inconsistent with a
general plan . . . such zoning ordinance shall be amended within a reasonable time so that it is consistent with the general plan.
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plan and zone undeveloped unincorporated property for public
use, designating it to be taken far in the future. With property
owners able to invoke neither Klopping nor the dictum in
Candlestick, the result might well be that the municipality
could eventually acquire the land at a more advantageous
price.
Michael D. Torpey

PERSONAL INCOME TAX-VACATION HOMEOWNERS
IN STATE FOR TRANSITORY PURPOSE RETAIN NONRESIDENT STATUS DESPITE SPENDING MORE TIME
IN CALIFORNIA THAN IN HOME STATE-Klemp v. Franchise Tax Bd., 45 Cal. App. 3d 870, 119 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1975).
Mr. and Mrs. Klemp maintained their Illinois residency
before and after their 1937 marriage, although they seasonally
came to California for vacations, and travelled extensively each
year.' Before 1953, they maintained homes and apartments in
the Chicago area; after 1953 they occupied an apartment in an
apartment hotel when they were in Illinois.' In 1955, the
Klemps built a vacation home in Rancho Mirage, California.
Between 1959 and 1964, the period challenged by the California Franchise Tax Board, the Klemps had no business activities in California and owned no commercial or private properties in the state other than their vacation home at Rancho
Mirage.' They actively conducted their business in Illinois and
derived their income from Illinois sources; they derived no income from activities in California.' Except for a small household account for personal expenses which they kept in a Cali1. From the beginning of their marriage, the Klemps travelled extensively. Their
first year (1937-1938) they were out of Illinois 115 days, and in no subsequent year were
they away less than 90 days. The following schedule shows where their time was spent
during the period in question:
Calendar
Days In
Days In
Days
Year
California
Illinois
Elsewhere
1959
116
97
152
1960
164
98
103
1961
171
69
125
1962
186
21
158
1963
159
33
173
1964
171
25
169
During those years their usual pattern was to be in California from October to April,
except for a Christmas holiday trip to Hawaii, and short trips to Chicago and elsewhere. Klemp v. Franchise Tax Bd., 45 Cal. App. 3d 870, 873-74, 119 Cal. Rptr. 821,
823 (1975).
2. Id. at 872, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 873-74, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 824. For many years the Klemps' principal
business activity consisted of the design, construction, repair and leasing of motor
freight terminals in Illinois. Their corporation, the Dale Oil Company, was liquidated
in 1963; however, the purchasers defaulted and the Klemps were required to take the
business back until 1965 when they again sold it. During fiscal years 1960 through 1964
they continued to receive income solely from Illinois investments in mortgages on other
terminals and from loans to truck operators. Id. at 874, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 823.

1975]

KLEMP v. TAX BOARD

fornia bank, the Klemps maintained their bank accounts and
safe deposit box in Illinois banks. In addition to being registered voters in Illinois, the Klemps carried Illinois drivers' licenses and registered their automobiles there. They had prepared and left their wills in Chicago. They relied on the services
of Illinois lawyers, doctors, dentists, accountants, bankers, and
investment counselors. Their business correspondence, including collections and deposit of income, was handled in Illinois.
Before and after they acquired their California vacation home,
they prepared and filed their federal income tax returns in
Illinois. All of their insurance was handled in Illinois except
coverage on the Rancho Mirage vacation home. They had no
church affiliation in California, but they were members of a
Chicago church.5 Mr. Klemp owned a burial plot in Chicago.
Further, the Klemps were domiciliaries not of California but of
Illinois.'
The Klemps' only California contact, other than their vacation home and household bank account, was their membership and participation in the Thunderbird Country Club which
was located in Rancho Mirage.7
Nonetheless, basing its view on its interpretation of the
statutory definition of residence,' the California State Fran5. Id. at 874, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 823-24.
6. Id. at 874-75, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
Although residence is frequently construed to mean domicile, the terms are not
synonymous. See Burt v. Scarborough, 56 Cal. 2d 817, 821, 366 P.2d 498, 501, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 146, 149 (1961); Michelman v. Frye, 238 Cal. App. 2d 698, 704, 48 Cal. Rptr. 142,
145-46 (1965); CAL. Civ. CODE § 4530 (West 1970); CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 395 (West
1973); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 243, 244 (West 1966); CAL. PROB. CODE § 301 (West 1956).
Residence is an objective term; it denotes any factual place of abode of some

permanency.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1473 (4th rev. ed. 1968). See Sabine,

Constitutionaland Statutory Limits on the Power to Tax, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 23 (1960).
Domicile, on the other hand, is a term involving subjective intentionsof the individual;
it denotes the one location with which a person is considered to have the greatest
settled and permanent connnection; it is the place where he intends to remain and to
which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 572 (4th rev. ed. 1968); see Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 239, 288 P.2d
497, 499 (1955); Whittell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 231 Cal. App. 2d 278, 284, 41 Cal. Rptr.
673, 676 (1964). See generally Keesling, The Problem of Residence in State Taxation
of Income, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 706 (1941); Sabine, Constitutionaland Statutory Limits
on the Power to Tax, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 23 (1960). Furthermore, an individual may
reside in this state without being domiciled here, and conversely, may be domiciled in
this state but not reside here. See generally CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18 §§ 17014-17016(a)
(1967). Although a person may have only one domicile at any given time, he may have
more than one physical residence separate from his domicile at the same time. Burt
v. Scarborough, 56 Cal. 2d 817, 822, 366 P.2d 498, 501, 17 Cal. Rptr. 146, 149 (1961).
7. 45 Cal. App. 3d 876-77, 119 Cal. Rptr. 825-26.
8. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17014 (West 1970) defined residency as follows:
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chise Tax Board considered Mr. and Mrs. Klemp to be residents of California for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1960
through 1964, and assessed taxes against their income for those
years.' The Klemps appealed to the State Board of Equalization, which sustained the assessment. They then filed this action in the superior court praying for declaratory relief. The
superior court entered judgment in favor of the Klemps, declaring they were not residents of California for income tax purposes during any of the years in question." The court of appeals
affirmed.
The governing statutes fixing state income tax liability,
Revenue and Taxation Code sections 17014,11 17015,12 17016,'1

and 17041,'4 provide, inter alia, that "[e]very individual who
is in this state for other than a temporary or transitory purpose" is a resident. 5 Residence, however, is a term with multiple definitions, its statutory meaning depending on the context
and the purpose of the statute in which it is used."
(a) Every individual who is in this State for other than a temporary
or transitory purpose.
(b) Every individual domiciled in this State who is outside this
State for a temporary or transitory purpose.
Any individual who is a resident of this State continues to be a
resident even though temporarily absent from the State.
9. The tax assessments were based on fiscal years ending June 30. 45 Cal. App.
3d at 873, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23.
10. CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 1060.5 (West Supp. 1975) provides in relevant part:
Any individual claiming to be a nonresident of the State of California for
purposes of the Personal Income Tax Law may commence an action in
the Superior Court . . . against the Franchise Tax Board to determine
the fact of his residence in this State.
11. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17014 (West 1970). See note 8 supra.
12. Id. § 17015 "'Nonresident' means every individual other than a resident."
13. Id. § 17016 raises a rebuttable presumption of residence:
Every individual who spends in the aggregate more than nine months
of the taxable year within this State shall be presumed to be a resident.
The presumption may be overcome by satisfactory evidence that the
individual is in the State for a temporary or transitory purpose.
14. Id. § 17041 provided in relevant part:
(a) There shall be imposed for each taxable year upon the entire
taxable income of every resident of this State . . . taxes in the following
amounts . ...
15. Id. § 17014(a). See note 8 supra.
16. Burt v. Scarborough, 56 Cal. 2d 817, 821, 366 P.2d 498, 501, 17 Cal. Rptr.
146, 149 (1961) (for venue purposes residence is equated with domicile); Myers v.
Carter, 178 Cal. App. 2d 622, 625, 3 Cal. Rptr. 205, 207 (1960) (personal injury action;
residence construed to mean actual residence rather than domicile); Whittell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 231 Cal. App. 2d 278, 284, 41 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676-77 (1964) (for tax
purposes residence means physical presence as a nontransient and is not synonymous
with domicile).
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The Franchise Tax Board asserted that the legislature in7
tended, in enacting these specific sections,'
to include in the category of individuals who are taxable
upon their entire net income, regardless of whether derived
from sources within or without the State, all individuals
who are physically present in this State enjoying the benefit and protection of its laws and government, except individuals who are here temporarily . .

.

The underlying theory of these sections, it maintained, "is that
the state with which a person has the closest connection during
9
the taxable year is the state of his residence,"' and the state
2
in which he should share in the tax burden. "
Thus, the Board's first argument dealt with a comparison
between the amount of time the Klemps spent in California
and the amount of time they spent in Illinois during the years
in question.2 It pointed dramatically to the fact that in 1962
the Klemps spent 186 days in California and only 21 days in
Illinois, and that they remained in California a greater number
22
of days during each of the years in question than in Illinois.
The court of appeals ruled that the time spent in California was only one factor in the determination and was not conclusive of residency in the state.23 It was an element to be
considered in assessing whether the Klemps were in the state
4
for temporary or transitory purposes. However, the Board's
own guideline specified that
17.
supra.

18.

CAL.

REV. &

TAX. CODE §§

CAL. ADM. CODE tit.

17014-16, 17041 (West 1970). See notes 11-14

18 §§ 17014-17016(a) (1967).

19. Id.
In Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1939), the Court stated that

"domicile in itself establishes a basis for taxation." In New York ex rel Cohn v. Graves,
300 U.S. 308, 316 (1936), the Court stated: "[Tlhe subject of tax is the receipt of
income by a resident of the taxing state, and it is within its taxing power even though
derived from property beyond its reach." These decisions seem to give constitutional
authority to the states to tax on a basis analogous to the minimum contact basis for
in personam jurisdiction described in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945). See Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, supra at 279-81, and New York ex rel
Cohn v. Graves, supra at 313-16. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 17014 (West 1970) applies
a more restrictive rule reflecting a fair and practical basis for taxation as intended by
the legislature. Whittell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 231 Cal. App. 2d at 284, 41 Cal. Rptr.
at 677 (1964). See generally CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18 §§ 17014-17016(a) (1967).
20. See note 14 supra.
21. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 876, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17016 (West 1970).
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[wihether or not the purpose for which an individual is
in this state will be considered temporary or transitory in
character will depend to a large extent upon the facts and
circumstances of each particular case . . . .

Revenue and Taxation Code section 17016 raises a rebuttable presumption of residence for those individuals present in
the state for more than nine months of the taxable year.2" Additionally, the Tax Board will, in proper cases, apply a similar
presumption of residence to an individual present in the state
for six months." The presumptions, however, may be defeated
upon a showing that the individual's presence in the state was
5 The
for temporary or transitorypurposes."
court held that the
facts showed the Klemps' purpose was "to spend the colder half
of the year as visitors in the California desert."
The Tax Board also argued that the Klemps did not, during the years in question, own or maintain an abode in Illinois.2 1
The court concluded,
[Tihis lack of an abode in Illinois was simply a function
of economy and convenience in a lifestyle which included
not only winters in California, but other seasons habitually
spent as visitors and tourists in other vacation spots.

Thus the existence or non-existence of an Illinois home was "a
factor to be considered" but "under the statute the decision
must turn ultimately upon what the Klemps were doing in
California." 3" The court of appeal also relied on regulations
issued by the Tax Board"' which expressly provide that an indi25. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18 §§ 17014-17016 (b) (1967).
26. Before their amendment in 1967, the regulations issued by the Franchise Tax
Board interpreted § 17016 to create an irrebuttable presumption of residence for those
individuals who were present in the state for more than six months. The 1967 amendment to the Board's regulations providing a rebuttable presumption of residence remains the current interpretation of the statute pertinent to this case. Because the
statute had remained unchanged, the contemporary interpretation by the Board is
entitled to great weight. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 875-76 n.4, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25 n.4.
See note 33 infra.
27. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18 §§ 17014-16 (b) (1967).
28. Id. §§ 17014-16(e) interprets CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17016 and provides in
relevant part:
If an individual spends in the aggregate more than nine months of any
taxable year in this State it will be presumed that he is a resident of this
State. The presumption is not conclusive but may be overcome by satisfactory evidence that he is in the state for temporary or transitory purposes only.
29. 45 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
30. Id.
31. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19253 (West 1970) provides in relevant part:
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vidual may be a nonresident for state income tax purposes even
though he owns or maintains an abode in California, or has a
bank account in the state for the purpose of paying personal
expenses, or joins local social clubs. 2
The Klemp court considered each of the relationships and
interests which the Klemps maintained in each state, balanced
the "factors" or contacts, considered the board's interpretation
of the governing statutes,3 3 and determined that the Klemps
were most closely connected with Illinois. It held that they did
not become California residents, within the meaning of section
17014.
Klemp is significant because it is the only decision by a
California court to delineate the basic residency requirements
for state income tax liability. 4 It has determined that tax liability depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
There is also much import in the court's implicit consideration
of each of the Klemps' contacts with the state as factors on a
cumulative basis rather than as absolute and inelastic measurements for tax liability."
The court in Klemp neither sought to establish a new basis
for state taxation nor proposed to allow individuals to enjoy the
benefits and protections of the state's government while escaping the state tax burden. Rather, it applied the standards established in the statute and the regulations in a fair and practical manner, halting the Franchise Tax Board's past practice of
The Franchise Tax Board shall prescribe all rules and regulations
necessary for the enforcement of this part and may prescribe the extent
to which any ruling or regulation shall be applied.
32. CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 18 §§ 17014-17016(b) (1967).
33. The contemporaneous administrative construction of a statute by the agency
charged with its enforcement is entitled to great weight and the courts will not depart
from such construction unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized. Select Base
Materials Inc. v. Bd. of Equalization, 51 Cal. 2d 640, 647, 335 P. 2d 672, 677 (1959);
accord, Whittell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 231 Cal. App. 2d 278, 286, 41 Cal. Rptr. 673,
678 (1964).
34. In Whittell v. Franchise Tax Bd., 231 Cal. App. 2d 278, 41 Cal. Rptr. 673
(1964), the court considered whether Californians had given up their California residence when they moved their domicile to Nevada. The court concluded, because of the
amount of time the Whittells spent in California and the substantial business and
social activities which they maintained in California, their presence in that state was
neither temporary nor transitory. Id. at 288, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 681. The Klemp decision
is the first case to determine whether persons from another state have acquired a
residence in California. 45 Cal. App. 3d 870, 119 Cal. Rptr. 821.
35. See 45 Cal. App. 3d at 876-77, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26.
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interpreting the tax code sections on residency in a nonuniform manner. 8
Michael D. Weiner
36. The Franchise Tax Board has on prior occasions contended that individuals
in situations similar to the Klemps' were residents of California for purposes of state
income taxation, see, e.g., Allen Sherman & Suzanne Sherman, 10 Cal. St. Bd. Equalization R. 133, 4 CCH STATE TAX CAS. REP., CAL. 201-964 (1962). The Shermans first
visited California in 1945, and in 1948 they purchased a house in the state. For each
of the years 1949-1956 the Shermans divided their time approximately equally between
Illinois and California. They maintained their business and economic interests and
most of their social activities in Illinois. They were domiciliaries of Illinois. The State
Board of Equalization overruled the Franchise Tax Board, and determined on the basis
of all the facts that the Shermans were most closely connected with Illinois, that they
were not residents of California for state income tax purposes, and that their time spent
in California was consistent with their position that California was their vacation home
from which they sought relief from Illinois winters.

